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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
PIamtiff7AppeIIee5
Case No. 20060407-CA
KATHY HALL,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals the trial court's interlocutory order denying her motion to quash
her bindover on one count of endangerment of a child, a third degree felony. This Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d).1
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Police executing a search warrant on defendant's house smelled an overwhelming
odor of a methamphetamine lab surrounding the place. They found debris from a meth lab
in the garage; methamphetamine, scales, packaging material, and pseudoephedrine in a
transparent drawer in one adult resident's open bedroom; a used meth glass pipe wrapped in
tissue paper in defendant's closet; and defendant's 13-year-old daughter in the living room.

!

Unless otherwise stated, all code citations are to the West 2004 publication.

Issue No. 1: Did defendant intentionally or knowingly permit her 13-year-old
daughter to be exposed to controlled substances, chemical substances, or
paraphernalia?
Standard of Review: On appeal, a magistrate's bindover decision is granted some
deference. State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, % 26, 137 P.3d 787. Whether the district court
properly interpreted Utah's child endangerment statute is a question of law, reviewed for
correctness. See State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, ^ 8, 84 P.3d 1171.
Issue No. 2: Is Utah's child endangerment statue, which proscribes exposing a
child

to

controlled

substances,

chemical

substances,

or

paraphernalia,

unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant's conduct?
Standard of Review: Constitutional challenges to statutes present questions of law,
which are reviewed for correctness. State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, % 42, 99 P.3d 820.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5. Endangerment of child or elder adult
(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) "Chemical substance" means a substance intended to be used as a
precursor in the manufacture of a controlled substance, or any other
chemical intended to be used in the manufacture of a controlled
substance. Intent under this subsection may be demonstrated by the
substance's use, quantity, manner of storage, or proximity to other
precursors, or to manufacturing equipment.
(b) "Child" means the same as that term is defined in Subsection 76-5109(l)(a).
(c) "Controlled substance" means the same as that term is defined in
Section 58-37-2.
(d) "Drug paraphernalia" means the same as that term is defined in
Section 58-37a-3.
2

(e) "Elder adult" means the same as that term is defined in Section 765-111.
(2) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who
knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder adult to be
exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance,
chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Subsection (1), is
guilty of a felony of the third degree.
(3) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who
violates Subsection (2), and a child or elder adult actually suffers bodily injury,
substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury by exposure to, ingestion of,
inhalation of, or contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or
drug paraphernalia, is guilty of a felony of the second degree unless the
exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact results in the death of the child or
elder adult, in which case the person is guilty of a felony of the first degree.
(4) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a violation of this section that the
controlled substance was provided by lawful prescription for the child or elder
adult, and that it was administered to the child or elder adult in accordance
with the prescription instructions provided with the controlled substance.
(b) As used in this Subsection (4), "prescription" has the same definition as
in Section 58-37-2.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of child endangerment, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5, and one count of possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5. Rl-3.
After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate bound defendant over on both counts. R70-71,
80-83, 190-95.
Defendant moved to quash the bindover on only the child endangerment count,
arguing that the evidence at preliminary hearing did not support a finding of probable cause,
and that the "exposed to" language of the child endangerment statute was unconstitutionally
3

vague. R36-49. The district court waited to rule on the motion, pending this Court's
decisions in State v. Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, 128 P.3d 1223, cert, denied, 138 P.3d 589
(Utah May 25, 2006) and State v. Draper, 2006 UT App 6, 128 P.3d 1220. Rl 17, 160-72,
180. After those decisions were issued, the district court took supplemental briefing, heard
oral argument, and denied the motion. Rl60-72, 180.
This Court granted defendant's petition for interlocutory review of the denial of her
motion to quash the bindover on the child endangerment count.2 R185.
STATEMENT OF FACTS3
On the afternoon of December 8, 2003, the Neighborhood Narcotics Unit of the Salt
Lake County Sheriffs Department executed a search warrant on defendant's home. R53-54.
The unit had received information of a methamphetamine lab and drug dealing at the home.
R54. Defendant was a primary target of the investigation. R55, 61.
An overwhelming odor
As Detective Wester, the lead investigator, reached the curb in front of the house, he
could smell the "overwhelming" odor of a meth lab. R59. While he was not sure whether
he could also smell the odor inside the house, he could smell it behind the house. R59.

2

The possession of paraphernalia count is not at issue on this appeal.

3

The record contains only an unofficial transcript, prepared by the Salt Lake Legal
Defender's Association, found at R53-71 in the pleadings file. The State does not object
to using this unofficial transcript for purposes of this interlocutory appeal, but has taken
the liberty of correcting spelling and punctuation errors when quoting the transcript.
Also, in keeping with well-settled appellate principles of review, the following facts are
recited "in a light most favorable to the prosecution . . . resolv[ing] all inferences in favor
of the prosecution." State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995).
4

Before entering the detached garage, officers donned protective gear—respirators and
hazmat suits.4 R60, 65. There, in addition to the odor, they found debris from a meth lab,
including bottles (some empty) of HEET,5 black tape, and stained rubber gloves. R59.
Detective Wester, who had training in both narcotics and clandestine labs, explained that
HEET is used to break up ephedrine or the glue used on striker plates and matches, which
helps break up red phosphorous. R59. The black tape is used to connect pipes. R59. The
officers did not test or seize the rubber gloves because "by products of methamphetamine are
potentially carcinogenic; they are definitely considered hazardous waste and [police] cannot
take those into evidence." R67.
"[A]11 the doors in every room wferej open"
Inside the house were seven people, including defendant's 13-year-old daughter,
Tiffany.6 R55-56, 60. Tiffany, who had no visible physical impairments, was in the living
room, upstairs or on the main floor. R56. Defendant was in the process of moving out and
"all the doors in every room w[ere] open." R57. Two of those open doors led to the
>

basement bedrooms of Teresa Albretson and defendant. R57, 60.

4

The unofficial transcript says "Tagget" suits. R60. That appears to be a mistranscription, because the State could find no information regarding protective "Tagget"
suits used for meth or other hazardous waste clean up. Given the context, the correct
word is most likely "hazmat," which sounds similar to "Tagget."
5

HEET is a gasoline additive. See R210:8; see also http://www.goldeagle.com/
heet/index.htm.
6

This brief refers to the minor victim by her first name. In so doing, the State does
not intend to encourage this Court to depart from its current practice of identifying minors
in court decisions by initials only.
5

In Albretsen's bedroom, police found methamphetamine, scales, packaging material,
and a package of pseudoephedrine pills, which are commonly used in the production of
methamphetamine. R58-60,65. This contraband was in an unsecured set of plastic drawers,
about three feet high. R58. The sides of the drawers were transparent. R58.
In defendamfs bedroom, police found a glass pipe wrapped in tissue paper on a closet
shelf, just above the hanging rod. R57-58,62-63. The pipe, which had burn marks and white
smoky residue inside, was like those commonly used to ingest meth. R57-58,67-68. Other
than the tissue paper, nothing obscured the pipe from view, which sat uin the front of the
closet." R58. Tiffany was tall enough to reach the pipe. R. 57-58.
Magistrate's ruling
The magistrate thought there "might be an issue" as to whether Tiffany had been
exposed to the contraband in the house. But the magistrate thought "there is no question"
that she was "exposed" within the meaning of the child endangerment statute based on "the
officer's description of an 'overwhelming odor of a meth lab5 that he could smell even at the
curb." R70. The magistrate noted that meth labs "have a very distinctive pungent smell" and
that "if you have got a 13 year old living at that home even though the garage is detached
there is no question in this Court's mind that that smell would be something that that child
would be exposed to." R70. Considering the odor in conjunction with the drugs and
paraphernalia found in the house, the magistrate found probable cause to believe that
defendant had committed the crime of child endangerment. R70.

6

District court's ruling
In denying defendant's motion to quash the bindover, the district court considered the
items of contraband found in the house; Tiffany's mobility and apparent access to all portions
of the home, including the rooms where the items were found; the meth lab debris in the
garage; and the "overwhelming odor of a methamphetamine lab." R190-93.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: The preliminary hearing evidence and its reasonable inferences were more
than sufficient to raise a reasonable belief that defendant knowingly permitted her child to
be exposed to controlled substances, chemical substances, or paraphernalia within the
meaning of Utah's child endangerment statute. As this Court held in State v. Nieberger, the
ordinary and accepted meaning of "expose to" is "'to place in a position where the [child]
spoken of is open to danger, or where it is near or accessible to anything that may affect it
detrimentally.'" 2006 UT App 5 4 1 5 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary, 579 (6th ed. 1990)).
Here, the defendant permitted her 13-year-old child to live in a home that was the site
of methamphetamine manufacture, sales, and use. The child's home was surrounded by the
"overwhelming" odor of a meth lab; debris from a meth lab, including substances used to
manufacture meth, was found in the detached garage; methamphetamine, scales, packaging
material, and pseudoephedrine was found in a three-foot tall transparent drawer in one adult
resident's open bedroom; and a used meth glass pipe, wrapped in tissue paper, was found in
defendant's closet, where her child could reach it. All this conduct amounted to placing a

7

child in a position where she was exposed to the serious dangers of controlled substances,
chemical substances, or paraphernalia, as those items are defined by the statute.
Taken together, the foregoing evidence and reasonable inferences support a
reasonable belief that defendant knew methamphetamine was being manufactured, sold, and
used on the premises: the odor of the meth lab was overwhelming; methamphetamine,
scales, and packaging were in the house; and defendant possessed a used methamphetamine
pipe, showing that she herself used the drug and, therefore, was likely tied to both the lab and
the contraband.
Point II: Defendant argues that the term "exposed to" in the child endangerment
statute is unconstitutionally vague both facially and as applied to her because it does not give
fair warning of what is prohibited to persons of ordinary intelligence, and it creates a risk of
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Defendant does not have standing to facially
challenge the child endangerment statute for vagueness, however, because she has not
alleged or shown that the statute implicates any First Amendment or other constitutionally
protected freedom. Defendant, therefore, is limited to challenging the statute as vague only
as applied to her conduct.
The ordinary and accepted meaning of "exposed to" is sufficiently clear to place a
person of ordinary intelligence on notice that the statute prohibits defendant's
conduct—exposing a child to the fumes of a meth lab and keeping drugs and paraphernalia
in a place where the child could see and access them.

8

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING EVIDENCE SUPPORTS A
REASONABLE BELIEF THAT DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY
EXPOSED HER CHILD TO CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES,
CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES, OR PARAPHERNALIA
Defendant argues that the preliminary hearing evidence did not establish that she
knowingly permitted her child to be exposed to controlled substances, chemical substances,
or paraphernalia within the meaning of the child endangerment statute. She contends that
her child was not "exposed" to any of the contraband because "the items were secreted in
downstairs bedrooms occupied by adults or consisted only of'debris5 or an odor, and Tiffany
was found alone in an upstairs living room away from these items." Br. Aplt. 9. She also
argues that "the evidence did not establish probable cause to believe that the debris in the
garage or the odor qualified as contraband under the statute." Br. Aplt. 9. She finally
contends that the evidence does not show that she "knowingly" permitted her child to be
exposed to the odor of the meth lab, where no evidence showed that she even knew what a
meth lab smelled like or that it was coming from her garage. Br. Aplt. 23.
Contrary to defendant's claims, a child is "exposed" to chemical substances within the
plain meaning of the statute when an overwhelming odor of a meth lab surrounds the house
where the child resides. Under this Court's decision in State v. Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5,
ffi[ 17, 22, 128 P.3d 1223, cert denied, 138 P.3d 589 (Utah 2006), a child is also exposed to
drugs, chemical substances, and paraphernalia when she can both "see and potentially access

9

them." And, notwithstanding defendant's protestations, the evidence was more than
sufficient to raise a reasonable belief that she "knowingly" permitted her child to be exposed
to the chemical substances in the garage, where the smell was overwhelming, the garage was
hers, and she possessed a used methamphetamine pipe, thereby showing her likely
connection to the lab and other contraband in the house.
A.

Bindoveir standard*
"To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show 'probable cause' at a

preliminary hearing by 'presenting] sufficient evidence to establish that the crime charged
has been committed and that the defendant has committed it.5" State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, %
10, 20 P.3d 300 (quoting State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995)) (additional
internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This is the sole function of the preliminary
hearing. Utah Const., art. I, § 12. "[T]o prevail at a preliminary hearing, the prosecution
must... produce believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged." Clark, 2001
UT 9, ^| 15 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The quantum of evidence necessary to support a finding of probable cause for a
bindover is "relatively low"—the same as that for obtaining an arrest warrant. Id. at ^[ 10,
16. See also State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, % 18, 137 P.3d 787. Under both standards, the
prosecution must only present '"sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief"that an
offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it.'" Id. at f 20 (quoting
Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 16) (emphasis added).

10

In determining whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief that defendant
committed each element of the charged offense, u[t]he magistrate must view all the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the prosecution." Clark, 2001 UT 9 % 10 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted) (alternation in original). See also State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, ^| 3,26 P.3d 223
(magistrate must "resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution"). "[Wjhen faced with
conflicting evidence, the magistrate may not sift or weigh the evidence . . . but must leave
those tasks to the fact finder at trial." Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 10 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). Thus, when the evidence gives rise to alternative reasonable inferences,
the magistrate must choose those inferences that support the State's case. See id. at f 20
(although preliminary hearing evidence gave rise to two alternate inferences—one suggesting
innocence and the other guilt—viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
evidence supported probable cause); see also Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, ^f 20 ("Although
defendants' characterizations of the facts may also be plausibly inferred from the evidence,
there are clearly factual issues that must be resolved at trial, and the facts do not negate the
reasonable inferences presented by the State").
The Utah Supreme Court recently confirmed that a magistrate's authority to evaluate
credibility at the preliminary hearing stage "is limited to determining that 'evidence is wholly
lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the
[prosecution's] claim.5" Virgin, 2006 UT 29, % 24 (quoting State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435,
438 (Utah 1998)). Thus, it is "inappropriate for a magistrate to weigh credible but
11

conflicting evidence at a preliminary hearing" because "a preliminary hearing 'is not a trial
on the merits'" but only "'a gateway to the finder of fact."' Id. (quoting Talbot, 972 P.2d at
438).
B.

"Expose to" as used in the child endangerment statute means to lay a child open
to the prohibited substances and their inherent dangers.
Defendant was charged under subsection (2) of Utah's Child or Elder Adult

Endangerment Statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2) (West 2004). That subsection
makes it third degree felony for any person to "knowingly or intentionally cause[] or permitf j
a child or elder adult to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled
substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Subsection (1)." Utah
Code Ann. §76-5-112.5(2).
The prosecution proceeded under the theory that defendant "exposed" her daughter
to controlled substances, chemical substances, and drug paraphernalia. Thus, this case turns
on the statutory meaning of "exposed to."
The "primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent, as
evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve."
Foutz v. City of South Jordan, 2004 UT 75, ^J 11, 100 P.3d 1171 (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). See also In re Kunz, 2004 UT 71, ^ 8, 99 P.3d 793. This Court will
"'presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each term
according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.'" Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car System,

12

Inc., 2001 UT 29, % 12,24 P.3d 928 (quoting Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875
(Utah 1995)).
This Court followed the foregoing principles in construing "exposed to" in Nieberger,
another child endangerment prosecution.

There, the Court recognized that the child

endangerment statute "appears to represent the legislature's legitimate desire to protect the
more vulnerable members of society from the dangers of drugs and related materials." State
v. Nieberger, 2006 UTApp 5,^f 14 n.5,128 P3d 1223. This Court then adopted the ordinary
and accepted meaning of "exposed to" as found in the dictionary. The Court first turned to
Black's Law Dictionary, which defines "expose" as "[t]o show publicly, to display" and
[tjo place in a position where the object spoken of is open to danger, or where
it is near or accessible to anything that may affect it detrimentally, as to
'expose' a child, or to expose oneself or another to a contagious disease or to
danger or hazard of any kind.
Id. at ^f 15 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 579 (6th ed. 1990) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis added). In other words, placing a child where she is "open to danger"
or where she "is near or accessible to anything that may affect [her] detrimentally" is
"exposing" her to that thing or danger.
Lay dictionaries similarly define "expose" as "'to . .. subject to risk from a harmful
action or condition,' 'to submit or make accessible to a particular action or influence,' and
c

to cause to be visible or open to view.'" Id. (quoting Merriam Webster's Collegiate

Dictionary 410 (10th ed. 1993)). One electronic dictionary, not quoted in Nieberger, simply
sums up "expose" as "to lay open to danger, attack, harm," or "something specified." http://

13

dictionary.reference.com/browse/expose.

Thus, applied in the context of the child

endangerment statute, exposing a child merely means to lay that child open to controlled
substances, chemical substances, or paraphernalia, with their inherent dangers.
The Nieberger court held that exposing a child to controlled substances and
paraphernalia included keeping illegal drugs and paraphernalia where children could "see
and potentially access" them. Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, f 17. This is because, as the
Nieberger court rightly understood, leaving illegal drugs and paraphernalia where a child
could see and access them is laying that child open to, or placing her in a position where she
is open to, those items and their inherent dangers. This interpretation of the statutory term
falls squarely within the statutory intent of "protecting] the more vulnerable members of
society from the dangers of drugs and related materials/' Id. at ^f 14, n.5. If that is the aim
of the statute, the plain, ordinary meaning of "expose to" necessarily contemplates that adults
keep these dangerous substances in a secure place where the children are unlikely to see or
be able to access them.
But leaving contraband where a child could see and potentially access it is not the only
way in which a child may be "exposed" to these substances. As Nieberger recognized, the
statutory term "expose" is very broad, covering "a wide range of behaviors and
circumstances, some of which might otherwise seem innocuous." Id, at \ 14 n.5. For
example, an adult may expose or lay a child open to controlled substances by smoking
marijuana, snorting cocaine, or injecting heroin in the child's presence. Or a parent may
expose her child to the fumes and other attendant dangers of chemical substances by allowing
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a methamphetamine lab to operate on the premises. The toxic by-products used during
methamphetamine production can contaminate surfaces, drains, sinks, ventilation systems,
couches, carpets, and beds, "can persist in soil and groundwater for years"; and even in small
amounts can pose serious health risks. "Methamphetamine Frequently Asked Questions,"
available

at

http://www.kci.org/meth_info/faq_meth.htm;

"Cleaning

up

Former

Methamphetamine Labs," available at http://www.kci.org/ meth_info/meth_cleanup.htm;
"Guidelines

for

Cleaning Up

Former

Methamphetamine

Labs," available

at

http://www.deq.state.ok.us/LPDnew/MethLabs/meth.htm. Exposure to these chemicals and
their by-products can cause respiratory problems; skin, eye, nose, and throat irritation;
headaches; nausea; dizziness; vomiting; severe eye damage; decreased mental function;
anemia; kidney damage; birth defects; chest pain; lack of coordination; chemical burns;
cancer; and even death. "Cleaning Up Former Methamphetamine Labs," available at
http ://www.kci .or g/meth info/methcleanup .htm; Karen Swetlow, "Children at Clandestine
Methamphetamine

Labs:

Helping

Meth's

Youngest

Victims,"

available

at

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/bulletins/children/welcome.html; "Dangers to
Children Living at Meth Labs," available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/
bulletins/children/pg5.html;

see

also

Illinois

Department

of

Public

Health,

"Methamphetamine Laboratories and Cleanup," available at http://www.idph.state.il.us/
envhealth/factsheets/meth-labs.htm. Thus, while a child may not be able to see or access a
meth lab, she is certainly exposed to it within the meaning of the statute if it has been
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operating on the premises on which she lives, because she is laid open to the serious dangers
created by the lab.
In sum, "exposing" a child to controlled substances, chemical substances, or
paraphernalia means to place the child "in a position where [she] is open to" those substances
and their inherent risks. This includes storing contraband in a place accessible to children,
or any other conduct that lays a child open to "the dangers of drugs and related materials."
Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, \ 14 n.5. As this Court recognized in Nieberger, this is a factintensive question that will depend upon the circumstances of each case. Id..
C.

The plain language of the statute does not require the State to prove that the
exposure to the prohibited substances presented an actual risk of harm.
Defendant argues, as did Nieberger, that the child endangerment statute must be

interpreted to require some risk of harm to the child. Br. Aplt. 11. As defendant
acknowledges, however, Nieberger squarely rejected her argument. See Br. Aplt. 10,11 n.2;
Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5,ffif13-14.
Before 2002, the child endangerment statute required a showing of risk of actual harm
because it expressly "prohibited placing protected persons 'at risk of suffering bodily injury,
substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury from exposure to, ingestion or inhalation
of, or contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia.5" Id.
at H 13 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 (Supp. 2000)). But in 2002, "the legislature
amended the statute to its current form, removing the risk element and replacing it with
'causes or permits a child or elder adult to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have
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contact with' the enumerated materials." Id, (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5 (2003)).
The Nieberger court thus explained, ucThe omission of the element in the revised statute
logically can mean nothing but that the legislature's purpose deliberately was to remove
[risk] as an element of the offense.'" Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, f 14 (quoting State v.
Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314, 1315 (Utah 1983)) (alteration in Nieberger).
The statute's current structure confirms Nieberger's conclusion that the Legislature
intended to prohibit exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact, without more. While
subsection (2) of the statute no longer requires a showing of risk or actual harm, subsection
(3) does. Subsection (3) enhances the penalty to a second degree felony if a child actually
"suffers bodily injury, substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury by exposure to,
ingestion of, inhalation of, or contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or
drug paraphernalia." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(3). That subsection further enhances the
penalty to a first degree felony if the exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact results in
death. Id. In the face of subsection (2)'s omission, subsection (3)'s enhancements serve as
further compelling evidence that the Legislature did not intend to require that exposure be
read to require an actual risk of harm. This Court thus rightly held that uthe legislature's
express deletion of a risk element precluded] [the Court] from writing such an element back
into the statute." Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, ^ 14.
Defendant presents no basis for concluding that Nieberger was wrong on this point.
Nor does she present any basis for overruling Nieberger. See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393,
398-99 & n.3 (Utah 1994) (those asking "to overturn prior precedent have a substantial
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burden of persuasion" due to "the doctrine of stare decisis"; a court of appeals panel may
overrule its own decision only where "conditions have changed so as to render the prior
decision inapplicable").
Defendant nevertheless contends that risk or danger is inherent in the definition of
"expose" embraced by this Court in Nieberger. Br. Aplt. 13. Defendant is partially correct.
As illustrated by the above dictionary definitions and their application in Nieberger, exposing
a child to illegal drugs, chemical substances, or paraphernalia amounts to laying a child open
to a risk of, or even an actual, danger. But that does not mean that the Legislature intended
to required the State to prove such a risk. To the contrary, the 2002 amendments demonstrate
that this was not the Legislature's intent. Implicit in the amendments, however, is a
legislative finding that exposing a child to the prohibited items presents an inherent risk of
danger or haim. This is supported by the legislative debates on the 2002 amendments, on
which defendant relies and attaches in Addendum E of her brief.7

7

Ordinarily, a court should not resort to legislative history when, as here, the
statute is unambiguous. See Lovendahl v. Jordan School Dist, 2002 UT 130, ^J 58, 63
P.3d 705 (Durrant, J., concurring and dissenting with two justices concurring); see also
O'keefe v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 956 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998) (the term
"overtime" is clear and unambiguous and the court has "no need to resort to other
methods of construction"); Visitor Info. Cntr. Autk v. Customer Service Div., 930 P.2d
1196, 1198 (Utah 1997) ("Unless the statute on its face is unclear or ambiguous, we find
no need to delve into the uncertain facts of legislative history"). But in this case, the floor
debates demonstrate that the Legislature has determined that exposing children and elder
adults to the items prohibited in the statute poses an inherent risk of danger, which the
State is not required to prove. Thus, the floor debates support the plain meaning of the
statute.
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In introducing the 2002 amendments to the House, Representative Beck explained that
instead of requiring a showing of "risk," the original statute "should have simply made it
illegal to expose [children and elder adults] to a non-prescribed controlled substance." R95.
Representative Beck elaborated that exposure to such substances created an inherent risk of
harm: "Obviously they have already determined that the controlled substances are risky to
an individual's health, otherwise they would not be a controlled substance. The same is true
with the drug paraphernalia and chemicals used to making illegal drugs." Id. Representative
Beck further explained that the "current language unintentionally requires the prosecutor to
present scientific evidence to show that the controlled substances are dangerous." Id. That,
according to the representative, is "not only expensive but it's also ridiculous to spend all
their time trying to show that." Id.
Senator Julander, in presenting the amendment to the Senate, similarly expressed that
exposure to contraband in violation of the statute presents an inherent risk to children and
elder adults.

"Obviously," she explained, "we've already determined that controlled

substances are risky to an individual's health." Recording of the Proceedings of the 54th
Legislature, Senate Floor Debates of H.B. 125, Day 40, March 1,2002, Tape 46 (transcribed
by Adrienne Nakamura, secretary, Utah Attorney General's Office) (attached in
Addendum).8 Thus, she stated, the "current [pre-2002] language unintentionally requires

8

Although defendant has attached transcripts of the House floor debates, she has
attached only a partial transcript of the Senate floor debates on the amendment. For the
Court's convenience, the State has supplied a transcript of the rest of the Senate debates
at Addendum.
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a prosecutor to present specific evidence to show that controlled substances are dangerous."
Id.9 (Emphasis added).
In sum, under the plain language of the child endangerment statute, the State need not
make an independent showing of risk of actual harm or danger. Rather, the Legislature has
already determined that exposure to the prohibited substances, without more, carries an
inherent risk of harm or danger. Thus, as Nieberger held, the State need only prove exposure
to the prohibited items.
D.

The preliminary hearing evidence established a reasonable belief that defendant
knowingly exposed her child to controlled and chemical substances and
paraphernalia.
The question, then, is whether the evidence at preliminary hearing was sufficient to

create a reasonable belief that defendant "knowingly or intentionally cause[d] or permitted]"
her 13-year-old daughter "to be exposed to . . . a controlled substance, chemical substance,
or drug paraphernalia as defined in Subsection (1)." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2).
Subsection (1) defines "chemical substance" as "a substance intended to be used as a
precursor in the manufacture of a controlled substance, or any other chemical intended to be
used in the manufacture of a controlled substance." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(l)(a).
9

Senator Valentine initially objected to the amendment because he believed that
dropping the "at risk" language would criminalize the innocent possession of two or more
precursors in a house where children were present. Id. Senator Valentine's concern was
resolved, however, not by leaving the "at risk" language in, but by requiring that
possession of any precursors be with the intent to manufacture illegal drugs. Recording
of the Proceedings of the 54th Legislature, Senate Floor Debates of H.B. 125, Day 43,
March 4, 2002, Tape 49 (transcribed by Adrienne Nakamura, secretary, Utah Attorney
General's Office) (attached at Addendum). See also 2002 Laws of Utah, ch. 32.
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"Intent under this subsection may be demonstrated by the substance's use, quantity, manner
of storage, or proximity to other precursors, or to manufacturing equipment." Id.
Controlled substances under the statute include methamphetamine. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-112.5(l)(c); Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(f)(i); & Utah Code Ann. § 58-374(2)(a)(iii)(j). Drug paraphernalia include scales used for weighing a controlled substance,
equipment used or intended for use to ingest or inhale a controlled substance, and materials
used to package a controlled substance. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(l)(d) & Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37a-3.
The prosecution presented two theories of exposure at the preliminary hearing:
defendant knowingly "exposed" her 13 -year-old daughter to (1) the chemical substances used
in the manufacture of methamphetamine, as evidenced by meth lab debris in the garage and
the overwhelming odor surrounding the house; and (2) the methamphetamine, chemical
substance (pseudoephedrine), and paraphernalia found in the house. The preliminary hearing
and its reasonable inferences support both theories.
1.

Defendant knowingly permitted her child to be exposed to chemical
substances where an overwhelming odor of a meth lab, emanating from
the garage, surrounded the house where they lived.

When the preliminary hearing evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to, and
all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of, the prosecution, there can be no doubt that
defendant knowingly exposed or laid her 13-year-old daughter open to chemical substances
as defined by the statute.
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First, the testimony supports a reasonable belief that Tiffany was exposed to a
chemical substance. The testimony was uncontroverted that an "overwhelming" smell of a
meth lab surrounded the house where Tiffany lived. R59. The smell was so strong and
pervasive that Detective Wester could smell it from the curb and in the back yard. Id. The
apparent source of the smell came from the detached garage where the officers found debris
from a meth lab. RR59-60. Although the operating meth lab was no longer there, its odor
remained and pervaded the premises. While defendant asserts that there was no evidence that
Tiffany ever smelled the odor, Br. Aplt. 20,24, the reasonable inferences from the testimony
suggest otherwise. Given that the overwhelming odor surrounded the house, it is reasonable
to infer that Tiffany smelled it some time, either while in the house or at some point when
she had to leave the house. But even if Tiffany never actually "smelled" the odor, a
reasonable inference is that she was nevertheless "exposed to" it because of its pervasiveness
in the air.
Defendant argues that the State did not "establish probable cause to believe that the
debris in the garage or the odor qualified as a chemical substance, controlled substance or
paraphernalia under the child endangerment statute." Br. Aplt. 23. She contends that the
debris found in the garage only "consisted of empty bottles of HEET, black electrical tape,
stained rubber gloves and an odor that the officer characterized as the odor of a
methamphetamine lab," and that "none" of these items falls within the statutory definition
of a chemical substance. Id.
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As a preliminary matter, this Court should not address this issue because defendant
did not raise it below, nor has she argued any exception to the preservation rule. See State
v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (declining to address unpreserved claim in
interlocutory appeal from bindover, where defendant argued no exception to preservation
rule); see also State v. Briggs, 2006 UT App 448, IfiJ 4-5,147 P.3d 369. She challenged the
bindover only on the grounds that Tiffany was not exposed to the contraband, that defendant
did not "knowingly" expose her to any contraband, and that there was no evidence that the
debris in the garage came from a meth lab. See R68-69, R36-49, Rl 60-62. Defendant never
argued, as she does now, that none of the items fell within the statutory definition of a
chemical substance.
In any event, the preliminary hearing evidence amply demonstrated probable cause
that the odor pervading the premises was a direct result of chemical substances as defined
by the statute. A "chemical substance" is any "substance intended to be used as a precursor
in the manufacture of a controlled substance, or any other chemical intended to be used in
the manufacture of a controlled substance." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(l)(a). Intent may
be demonstrated by the "substance's use, quantity, manner of storage, or proximity to other
precursors, or to manufacturing equipment." Id. Controlled substance precursors include
ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and red phosphorous. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-3(2).
Here, Detective Wester, who had received training in narcotics and meth labs, testified
that the overwhelming odor was that of a meth lab. R53-54, 59. His identification of the
odor was confirmed by the discovery of HEET, black tape, and stained rubber gloves in the
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garage. Detective Wester testified that HEET is used to break up ephedrine and red
phosphorous, both precursors to the manufacture of methamphetamine. R59. He also
testified that black tape is used to connect pipes for a meth lab and that they did not test or
take the rubber gloves into evidence because the officers believed they were stained with
toxic by-products of methamphetamine.

R59-60, 65, 67.

The officers then found

pseudoephedrine, methamphetamine, scales, baggies, and a meth pipe in the house. R56-58.
These facts, taken together give rise to a reasonable inference that the overwhelming odor
was created by the combination of chemical substances in a meth lab in the garage.
Consequently, Tiffany was exposed to a chemical substance within the meaning of the
statute.10
10

Relying on State v. Draper, 2006 UT App 6, f 10, 128 P.3d 1220, defendant
asserts that the State could establish that the odor qualified as a chemical substance only
through expert testimony and that the State produced no such testimony. Br. Aplt. 24.
This argument is unpreserved and should be disregarded. See Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229.
In any event, the State did produce expert testimony through Detective Wester that the
odor came from a meth lab. R59. Detective Wester testified that he had training in meth
labs. R53-54. He therefore qualified as an expert under Rule 702, Utah Rules of
Evidence. See Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, (Utah 1993) (police officer qualified as
expert in accident reconstruction "by virtue of his 'experience [or] training"' (quoting
Utah R. Evid. 702)). As explained, a reasonable inference from that testimony was that
the odor came from chemical substances emanating from the garage.
Defendant nevertheless suggests, again for the first time on appeal, that Detective
Wester's experience was minimal, rendering his identification of the odor suspect. Br.
Aplt. 26. In support, she cites to a web cite for the proposition that "there are four
possible smells, some of which might appear similar to the smells found in ordinary
garages, which are associated with meth labs." Br. Aplt. 26. Even assuming that this
claim was preserved and that other smells are similar to that of a meth lab, that does not
help defendant The detective's uncontroverted testimony was that the smell belonged to
a meth lab. His testimony was supported by the discovery of chemicals, precursors,
equipment, methamphetamine, and paraphernalia on the premises. Thus, even assuming
that it was reasonable to believe that the detective was mistaken, that, at most, only raised
24

Defendant next argues that the State failed to show a reasonable belief that she
"knowingly" permitted Tiffany to be exposed to the odor of the methamphetamine lab. She
asserts that nothing suggests that she "was aware of the debris in the detached garage or the
odor outside or had knowledge that the debris in the garage qualified as contraband under
the child endangerment statute." Br. Apt. 22-23. She also claims that nothing showed "that
had she been aware of the odor, she would have known that it was caused by a
methamphetamine lab or that the odor emanated from the garage rather than a neighbor's
house or car." Id. at 23.
The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence, however, is that
defendant did smell the odor, which according to the uncontroverted testimony, was
"overwhelming" and could be sensed from the curb and backyard of the house. Another
reasonable inference is that defendant knew that the odor came from a meth lab in her garage
and not from somewhere else in the neighborhood.

First, the contraband found in

Albretson's bedroom suggests that methamphetamine was not only being produced on the
premises, but it was also being sold on the premises, two facts that would be difficult to hide
from other residents, such as defendant. That defendant was aware of these activities is
further supported by the presence of a used methamphetamine pipe in her closet. This

an alternative inference. When conflicting evidence or inferences are presented at a
preliminary hearing, the magistrate is bound to draw those in favor of the prosecution.
See Clark, 2001 UT 9, \ 10; Hawatmeh,2Q0l UT 51,ffi[3, 20.
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suggests that she herself was a methamphetamine user and therefore likely to have been well
aware of the manufacture and sale of the drug at her residence.
In short, the preliminary hearing evidence supports a reasonable belief that defendant
was fully aware that there had been an operating meth lab in her garage and that the fumes
still lingered. Yet, she permitted her child to live there and be exposed to the dangers of
those fumes.
2.

Defendant knowingly permitted her child to be exposed to
controlled substances and paraphernalia where those items were
kept where the child could both see and potentially access them.

The preliminary hearing evidence also supports a reasonable belief regarding the
prosecution's second theory—that defendant knowingly permitted her child to be exposed
to illegal drugs and paraphernalia, where those items were kept in places where the child
could both see and potentially access them.
This theory is governed by Nieberger. As stated, Nieberger held that a parent permits
her child to be exposed to controlled substances or paraphernalia where those items are kept
in a place where the child can both "see and potentially access" them. Nieberger, 2006 UT
App 5, % 17. Nieberger had two children, ages two and three, who resided with hen Id. at
^f 2. Nieberger told police that her husband had been selling marijuana for five years and that
she herself occasionally used marijuana. Id. Nieberger kept her personal supply of
marijuana and paraphernalia on the living room entertainment center, on a shelf five to six
feet off the ground. Id. Police found other controlled substances and paraphernalia in
Nieberger"'s house, including "several ounces of marijuana in a cabinet above the kitchen
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counter, a metal pipe with marijuana residue in a kitchen drawer, a Valium pill in a baggie
on the kitchen counter, a bong sitting on the television stand in the basement, and a broken
bong on the floor of the master bedroom closet." Id. at % 3.
Observing that Nieberger kept her marijuana and pipe "in plain view" in the living
room, this Court further noted that there was "nothing to suggest" that her two- and threeyear-old children "lacked the ordinary mobility, perception, or curiosity that could be
expected of children that age." Id. at f 12. Nor did the record suggest "that the children were
in any way restricted from accessing the rooms where the various items were found." Id.
This Court thus concluded that the factual circumstances in that case supported "a
reasonable inference that the Nieberger home was a frequent site for the use and sale of
marijuana, and that Nieberger's children were not isolated from that lifestyle." Id. at ^j 22.
Moreover, "the evidence suggested] that items of contraband were kept around the house
in various places that were visible and accessible to the children, and that Nieberger
knowingly permitted this to occur." Id. In other words, "Nieberger's alleged acts of
allowing her children to see and potentially access controlled substances and paraphernalia
[fell] squarely within [the child endangerment] statute's purview." Id. at \ 17 (emphasis
added). Significantly, Court reached this holding even though many of the items in
Nieberger were not in plain view or easily accessible to her small children. Rather, the
contraband was only "potentially" accessible. Thus, Nieberger teaches that a person exposes
a child to a controlled substance when she intentionally and knowingly leaves it in a place
where a child can "see and potentially access" it. Id.
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But "[wjhether any particular minor or elder adult has the ability to see and access a
particular object is a factual matter that must be resolved on a case-by-case basis, taking into
account the circumstances of the alleged exposure and the victim's physical abilities." Id.
at f 12 n.3. The circumstances here, while not identical to Nieberger, are similar and support
a reasonable belief that defendant knowingly exposed or laid her 13-year-old daughter open
to the drugs and paraphernalia found in both defendant's and Albretson's rooms.
As detailed above, defendant's home was the site for the manufacture, sale, and use
of methamphetamine. The overwhelming odor of the meth lab and evidence that meth was
being sold from the home raises a reasonable inference that Tiffany "w[as] not isolated from
that lifestyle." Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, ^J 22. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that Tiffany
could have been unaware of the illegal activities in her home.
In addition, the items of contraband found in the house were where Tiffany could both
"see and potentially access" them. Meth, scales, and packaging were kept in a three-foot-tall
transparent drawer in Albretson's closet. While these items were housed in Albretson's
bedroom, nothing protected Tiffany from finding, seeing, and accessing them. As in
Nieberger, nothing in the record suggests "that the [child was] in any way restricted from
accessing the rooms where the various items were found." Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5,^12.
Indeed, according to the detective, all the doors in the house were open. Defendant's meth
pipe was slightly more hidden, but still lay toward the front of a closet shelf that Tiffany
could reach. Under Nieberger, it does not matter whether Tiffany in fact saw these items.
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Rather, their storage in a place that was both in view and readily accessible to her put
Tiffany in position where she was laid open to or exposed to these dangerous items.
Defendant again asserts that no evidence showed that she was aware of the items or
their storage in Albretson's room.

Br. Aplt 22, 27. But, as explained above, the

circumstances taken as a whole support a reasonable inference that defendant was well aware
of the illegal activities in her home. Yet she took no steps to protect Tiffany from being
exposed to them. The doors to defendant's and Albretson's bedrooms were open and most
of the contraband was kept in a transparent, unsecured drawer. Defendant's own meth pipe
was kept on a shelf that Tiffany could reach.
Viewing the evidence and its logical inferences in the light most favorable to the
State, Tiffany could both see and potentially access all the contraband in the house. She was
therefore "exposed to" those items within the plain meaning of the child endangerment
statute. The district court, therefore, properly denied the motion to quash the bindover.
POINT II
UTAH'S
C H I L D E N D A N G E R M E N T STATUTE IS NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS APPLIED TO DEFENDANT
BECAUSE HER CONDUCT FELL SQUARELY WITHIN THE
PURVIEW OF THE STATUTE
Defendant challenges the child endangerment statute as unconstitutionally vague, both
facially and as applied to her. Br. Aplt. 28-29. As this Court held in Nieberger, defendant
does not have standing to facially challenge the child endangerment statute for vagueness
because she has not alleged, much less shown, that it implicates any First Amendment or
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other constitutionally protected freedom. 2006 UT App 5, f 11 n.2. She is therefore limited
to challenging the statute as vague as applied only to her.
Defendant has not shown that the statute is vague as applied to her because, read in
context, the term "exposed to" is sufficiently clear to place a person of ordinary intelligence
on notice that the statute prohibits knowingly permitting a child to live on premises where
the manufacture, sale, and use of methamphetamine is occurring, particularly where the
overwhelming odor of a meth lab surrounds the home. Moreover, as Nieberger held, a
person of ordinary intelligence would also understand that the statute prohibits leaving illegal
drugs and paraphernalia in a place where the child could both see and potentially access
them. Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, f 17.
A.

Defendant may not complain of the vagueness of a law as applied to the
hypothetical conduct of others.
Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a criminal statute must define the offense

"'with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited
and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'" State
v. Green, 2004 UT 76, f 43, 99 P.3d 820 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357
(1983)). A statute need not define an offense with "mathematical certainty," however.
Graynedv. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104,110 (1972). Statutes may use terms "marked by
'flexibility and reasonable breadth, rather than meticulous specificity/" as long as " it is clear
what the ordinance as a whole prohibits." Id. (quoting Esteban v. Cent. Missouri State
College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1088 (8th Cir. 1969)).
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Vagueness challenges "'which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be
examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand.'" Green, 2004 UT 76, f 44 (quoting
Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 n.7
(1982)). Absent a First Amendment or other constitutional violation, "a court will uphold
a facial vagueness challenge 'only if the [statute] is impermissibly vague in all of its
applications."' State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, % 12, 84 P.3d 1171 (emphasis added). "A
statute that is clear as applied to a particular complainant cannot be considered impermissibly
vague in all of its applications and thus will necessarily survive a facial vagueness
challenge." Id. Thus, "a court should 'examine the complainant's conduct before analyzing
other hypothetical applications of the law' when a challenged statute 'implicates no
constitutionally protected conduct.'" Green, 2004 UT 76, % 44 (quoting Hoffman, 455 U.S.
at 494-95).
Here, defendant's conduct—letting her child live in a home where methamphetamine
is being manufactured, sold, and used—does not involve a constitutionally protected right.
Defendant can only prevail, therefore, if she can show that the statute is vague as applied to
her conduct.11

11

Even if defendant could bring a facial challenge to the statute, it would fail. As
stated, a statute is facially vague "only if [it] is impermissibly vague in all its applications.
MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, ^J 12 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Defendant cannot make this showing here, because this Court held in
Nieberger that the statute was not vague as applied to those circumstances. Nieberger,
2006 UT App 5, Xh 14-17. A fortiorari, the statute is not vague in all of its applications.
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To prevail on her vague-as-applied challenge, defendant must show "either (1) that
the statutef] do[es] not provide 'the kind of notice that enables ordinary people to understand
what conduct [is prohibited]/ or (2) that the statute[] *encourage[s] arbitrary and
discriminator/ enforcement/" MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, f 13 (citations omitted). In other
words, the question is whether defendant was on notice that "her alleged actions might
violate the statute." Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, <[} 15 (citing Boyce Motor Lines, Inc., v.
United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952) (noting the "one who deliberately goes perilously
close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the line")).
B.

As used in the child endangerment statute, the term "expose to" is sufficiently
definite to put defendant on notice that her conduct was prohibited.
A person of ordinary intelligence would understand that the child endangerment

statute prohibited defendant's conduct. Defendant permitted her child to live in a home
where methamphetamine was manufactured, sold, and used. The house was surrounded by
the overwhelming odor of a meth lab that had been operating in the garage. Indeed, allowing
her daughter to be exposed to the fumes of a meth lab falls squarely within the purview of
the statute. In addition, according to Nieberger, a defendant's "alleged acts of allowing her
children to see and potentially access controlled substances and paraphernalia [also] falls
squarely within the statute's purview." Nieberger, 2006 UT App 5, %\ 14-15. Because
Nieberger's alleged acts fell "squarely" within the statute's purview," the Nieberger court
concluded that there was "no room for law enforcement officials to decide, in their
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discretion, that the statute's provisions should not apply." Id. at f 17. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
Defendant nevertheless asserts that this Court's decisions in Nieberger and Draper
"do not sufficiently define the term "exposed to" so as to guide law enforcement as to what
is required in order to expose a child to a controlled substance." Br. Aplt. 31. Defendant,
like Nieberger and Draper, continues to assert that the statute is vague and encourages
arbitrary enforcement so long as it is not interpreted to require an actual risk of harm. To
support this claim, defendant relies on three out-of-state decisions, State v. Downey, 476
N.E.2d 121 (Ind. 1985), Commonwealth v. Carter, 462 S.R2d 582 (Va. C t App. 1995), and
State v. Scruggs, 905 A.2d 24 (Conn. 2006). None of these cases is helpful, however,
because they construed statutes completely different from the one at issue here.
The statute in Downey prohibited a "person having the care, custody or control of a
dependent" from "knowingly or intentionally [placing] the dependent in a situation that may
endanger his life or health." Downey, 476 N.E.2d at 122. The Downey court held that the
statute, construed literally, criminalized exposing a dependent "to the risk of a risk of harm."
Id. at 123. Thus, "it would be a crime to raise a child in a high-rise apartment or to mop the
kitchen floor with a bucket of water in the presence of a small child." Id. This literal
construction, the Downey court said, had "a broadness and vagueness which would prevent
it from meeting constitutional muster." Id. To avoid this constitutional infirmity, Downey
read the statute to require that the "placement must itself expose the dependent to a danger
which is actual and appreciable/' Id.
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Carter interpreted a similar statute, which prohibited a child's custodian from
"willfully or negligently" permitting the child "to be placed in a situation that its life, health
or morals may be endangered

" Carter, 462 S.E.2d at 584 (emphasis added). The Carter

court concluded that "[b]y using the term 'may/ the legislature criminalize[d] any act which
presented] a 'possibility5 of physical or moral harm to the child." Id. at 585 (citation
omitted). Accordingly, Carter found this provision of the statute to be unconstitutionally
vague. Id.
Scruggs likewise involved a statute that prohibited a risk of harm to the child. That
statute prohibited "wilfully or unlawfully" causing or permitting a child under sixteen "to be
placed in such a situation that the life or limb of such child is endangered, the health of such
child is likely to be injured or the morals of such child are likely to be impaired . . . ."
Scruggs, 905 A.2d at 26. Scruggs's 12-year-old son committed suicide by hanging himself
in his bedroom closet. Id. The boy had been "bullied relentlessly at school" and "frequently
exhibited poor hygiene and occasionally defecated in his pants." Id. The condition of his
apartment when he hung himself was "extremely cluttered and... it had an unpleasant odor."
Id. at 27. The boy's mother was prosecuted on the ground that she should have known that
the condition of her home placed her child in a position where his mental health was likely
to be impaired. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the statute was vague as applied
to Scruggs's conduct because a person of ordinary intelligence would not have been on
notice "that the conditions in her apartment posed an unlawful risk to the mental health of
a child." Id at 36.
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"Publications", then follow "Annual Reports").

(follow

"Children of drug abusing parents,

particularly drug-abusing mothers, are [also] more likely to be disobedient, aggressive,
withdrawn and detached. These children also tend to have fewer friends, lower confidence
in their ability to make friends and a greater likelihood of being avoided by their peers." Id.
According to this study, these children are also at a heightened risk of being abused or
neglected. Id. at 20. But the risks to a child's physical well-being are even higher, when, as
here, the child has been exposed to the toxic chemicals and by-products of a meth lab. See
Point I.C.
In short, exposing a child to illegal drugs and paraphernalia creates an inherent risk
of harm. The term "expose to," therefore, is not unconstitutionally vague merely because the
statute does not require a showing of a substantial risk of harm. Rather, the question is
whether the statute would place a person of ordinary intelligence on notice that defendant's
conduct is prohibited. As explained above, the answer is clearly "yes." Moreover, law
enforcement, prosecutors, and judges would not be left to guess whether the statute applies
to these circumstances—exposing a child to the fumes of a meth lab and keeping drugs and
paraphernalia in a place where the child can both see and access them.
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ADDENDUM
Senate Floor Debates on 2002 Amendment
t( "h ild Endangerment Statute

Senate Debate on HB 125 ' ' March 1, 2002
54*. Leg. General Session, Day 40 Tape 46
Mr. President- I < f , nrxl yd !u liou >t lull I " •<
; House bill 125 endangerment of child or elder person with contra M?d -. K? IT-:,
precursor, by representative (Inaudible) Senator Joe Lander.
Mr. President: Senator Julander
Senator Julanden There were two over sights dealing in the section dealing with a ch. id
» br adult in 76-5-112.5. We will correct those two problems with this bill. The lirst
iem is that the section contains an awkward (inaudible) requirement. Obviously
re already determined that controlled substances are risky to an individual's health.
The current language unintentionally requires a prosecutor to present specific'evidence to
• s\ that controlled substances are dangerous. This is not only expensive it's rather
IOUS. The other oversight in this section is that it contains no exceptions for" di\
TTxxxv:ti are administered in accordance with a prescription from a physician; this, bill also
fixes that problem. This bill was requested by the State Wide Association of Prosecutors
and supported by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice and (inaudible)
Commission, the Law Enforcement Legislative Committee, and the Utah Substance
Abuse Anti-Violence Counsel It passed unanimously in. all committees and on the house
floor
Mr. President: Senator Valentine?
Senator Valentine; Thank you.Mr. President. This bill (inaud" ^
Senator Julander: I can't hear him,
Mr, President: Try him again; let's see if it'll turn on (inaudible) again. Oh that's better.
Senator Valentine: I don't "'think, "that it was <m
. nu ^p.
^ 27, 28, and
29,1 remember the debate on this, and I rememi _L mat this w
mc elements of a
different crime; So that we have a different crime, of being e> ^
i addition to the
possession or the obvious crime of having the drug paraphernalia, the drugs themselves,
urn, of having urn, a meth. Lab, but the additional crime in addition to the, the uiiderlymg
crime was this exposure, and so by deleting out 27, 28, and 29 you now make it an
automatic crime. So that if the drug paraphernalia is in the same house someplace as the
child, but all of the sudden now you have two crimes that have been committed. And we
talked about that very thing, and we argued back and forth about that and we finally
decided that we wanted to have that felony crime, that enhanced crime there when you
had to prove one additional element, and the element was, the very things you're
dropping out. Can you tell me now why we will have-K\ o rrimes for one action, by
dropping that out? Why that's good policy?

1

Senator Julander: (There's still two crimes) I, if I understand your question, there's still
two crimes, but you don't. But, but if you look at line 17, it already defines the chemical
substance.
Senator Valenline: Yea, that's the chemical substance, but if it's someplace in the
dwelling, maybe even totally removed from where the children can get to, you're saying
now it's a second crime because you've dropped out, you make it an automatic second
crime. You dropped out the exposure provision, which was the provision that we
negotiated to put in as the second element of the crime.
Senator Julander: But if you, uh if they have to be exposed to it if you look in 33-32 they
have to exposed to it or ingest it.
Senator Valentine: But aren't you dropping out in the previous lines the exposure? Cause
you're saying unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who
knowingly or intentionally cause or permits a child or elder adult to be, and then you
have the language you're dropping out, which is the 'at risk' language. Isn't that
dropping out the exposure?
Senator Julander: But look on 29 it's exposed to, to ingest or inhale.
Senator Valentine: Obviously if you're dealing drugs to a kid, then that one is covered by
three.
Senator Julander: Excuse me?
Senator Valentine: If you're dealing drugs to a child then that one is covered by
paragraph three, and that's very obvious. I mean, and that should be an enhanced penalty.
It's just the exposure of it being in the premises that I'm worried about. (Murmurs) See
one of the problems is that if you have it just to the list of precursors on line 17 as you
originally talked about, there are some things on those Hst of precursors that are in a lot of
houses, probably your house. I could probably find some of those items; uh for example,
uh some of those items in smaller quantities are in your medicine cabinet. But you need
to be able to show exposure to those items, so that you cannot have a crime. I mean, that
bothers me 1hat you'd have a crime just because it's in the house. Let me give you one
example, ephedrine, that in over the counter medications for decongestant, that's
probably in medicine cabinet some place. Does that mean you committed a crime
because you're grandchildren are in the same house as you are? That's wh, that's what's
worrying me.
Mr. President: Senator Julander?
Senator Julander: I really think this is a policy question, and I would like to get more
information, and get to you and circle the bill at the proper time.

Mr. President: Thank you I wry: er>in * u> u
get back to it
OCL :HM . .-ij ;L-I
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then we A

. in_>c rnings are coming

Senator Lander: J hat's okay. That's okay; we'll clear it up*
Senator Valentine: Thank you.
Mr. President: The motion is to circle the bill, all in favor say aye.
Senate: Aye •
Mr. President: Opposed? Motion passes. Senator Steel.
llui

w aill j

..,., rwt L-a^i\ M aii you* T \v~-_ild like to circle the bill,.

Senator Valentine: And. senator thank you. \ur niu^i., • i--.
up pretty fast and I didn't get' to talk to you in advance. .
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Senate Debate on HB 125
March 4, 2002
th
54 Leg. General Session, Day 43 Tape 49
Mr. President: Senator Julander. I'm sorry I didn't give you a mic.
Senator Julander: We discussed this bill on Friday, and Senator Valentine raised some
questions and had some amendments, at this time I would yield to Senator Valentine.
Mr. President: Yes, Senator Valentine I'm sony, I'm day dreaming up here.
Senator Valentine: There's someplace here that I had some amendments on this messy
desk. They were passed out earlier, L I'm not quite sure where they are, have we got
those? Mr. President I move the amendments, and amendment number one under my
name did it March 1st, 2002. Let me explain those amendments, I raised some issues last
time about incidental contact with precursors with the, the elements and substances that
are in precursors. And uh, after going back and talking with some of our prosecutors we
found we did have a problem indeed, the problem is that, uh there has to be a sufficient
amount intended to be used in the manufacturing of a controlled substance, and then the
intent would then be presumed by the elements that were in the present bill. But that's
what the amendment does, it uh, makes it so that the problems that I raised last time
would not therefore be in the bill. That's my motion to amend.
Mr. President: Questions on the motion to amend? All in favor of the amendment say
aye.
Senate: Aye
Mr. President: Opposed? Motion passes; the bill as before us is amended. Senator Jewel
Julander?
Senator Julander: Thank you, uh I don't remember having any other questions, but at this
time I would take any other question if there are any regarding this piece of legislation.
Mr. President: Any questions on this legislation? See none Senator.
Senator Julander: I call for the vote that we, uh, under the suspension of the rules
(inaudible). That we move to the third calendar.
Mr. President: Motion is shall House Bill 123 be read for the third time, roll call vote.
Roll call vote is done, (inaudible).
Mr. President: Senator Bramble?

A

Senator Bramble: I apologize Fve been having trouble getting my computer up, out i vote
I on this. This is a bill that I spoke with the attorney that drafted it, and we resolved the
issues I'd misunderstood that bill So I do vote aye on it

vlr President: No there's nobody up there Senator Hickman.
_: Senator Hickman ?
Mr. President: That wasn't a voice from heaven, that's the roll call.
Senator Hickman: Aye.
Kiil.dlCb

Vlr. President: I'm waiting for a voice from heaven like Senator Hickman, to give me an
jlion. Alright. House Bill 125, received 25 aye votes, no nay votes, four being
!
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